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I

BY Bennett 1. Gershman

The Adversarial System at Risk
The 1980s witnessed a significant
alteration in the balance of power
between the prosecutor and defense counsel. The balance now tilts
strongly toward the prosecutor. The
prosecutor's ability t o obtain evidence through police searches,
seizures, undercover operations,
and interrogations was broadened
(United States v Leon, 468 US 897
(1984); New Yo& v Quarles, 467 US
649 (1984); United States v Kelly,
707 F2d 1460 (DC Cir 1983)), and
the defendant's ability to obtain
potentially exculpatory evidence
was limited (Arizona v Youngblood,
109 S Ct 333 (1988); United States
v Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 US 858
(1982)), making it easier for the
prosecution to obtain convictions.
Broader application of appellate
doctrines such as harmless error
(Rose v Clark, 478 US 570 (1986);
Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673
(1986)) and restrictions on postconviction remedies such as habeas corpus (Murray v Carrier, 477
US 478 (1986); Engle v Isaac, 456
US 107 (1982)) made it easier to
preserve those convictions. The
balance was further skewed by the
continued erosion of due process
constraints o n prosecutorial excesses in areas such as grand jury
practice (Bank of Nova Scotia v
United States, 108 S Ct 2369 (1 988)),
charging decisions (Wayre v United
States, 470 US 598 (1985)), plea
bargaining (Mabry v fohnson, 467
US 504 (1984)), disclosure of evidence (Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480
US 39 (1987)), and trial conduct
(Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168
(1986)).

However, the most ominous recent development affecting the
balance of forces in the adversary
system is the unprecedented attack by prosecutors on criminal defense lawyers themselves. Grand
jury subpoenas to attorneys, law
office searches, disqualification
motions, fee forfeiture proceedings, and, most recently, IRS attempts t o enforce currencyreporting regulations do not seem
to be isolated occurrences or mere
happenstance. Rather, perhaps inspired by Shakespeare's injunction
in Henry VI to "kill all the lawyers,"
some prosecutors appear to have
concluded that the most effective
way to prevail in the battle against
crime is to cripple the defense lawyers, particularly those who represent defendants in areas such as
enterprise drug crimes, currency
violations, and RlCO offenses.
The increasing use of this heavy
prosecutorial firepower against
criminal defense attorneys poses a
serious threat to the adversarial
system. Defense attorneys themselves will be placed on the defensive, thereby giv~ng prosecutors
considerable leverage over the attorney-client relationship. Many of
the most talented and aggressive
defense attorneys will be driven out
of defense work, unwilling to deal
with the pressures, harassment, and
potential loss of income from these
prosecutorial tactics. Finally, prosecutors will be empowered to refashion and to some extent even
control the course of private criminal defense representation. Although it is hazardous to predict the
outcome, these developments may
actually foreshadow the demise of

the system of private criminal defense work. (United States v Monsanto, 109 S Ct 2657, 2675 (1989)
(dissenting opinion).)

IRS Form 8300
Attorney subpoena litigation
continues to be a bitter source of
controversy, with attorneys risking
jail rather than revealing information that is detrimental to their
clients. (Julie DelCour, Attorneys
jailed for Keeping Silent, Natl L J,
Dec 18, 1989, p. 3.) As of this writing, however, an even more controversial investigative weapon
against attorneys is being tested.
This is the attempt by the IRS, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 5 60501, Form
8300, to force criminal defense attorneys to disclose the identities of
clients or third parties who pay cash
fees in excess of $10,000. (United
States v Fischetti, Pomerantz, and
Russo et al., No M-18-304 (S D NY,
Nov 16, 1989) (Order to Show
Cause).) As with fee forfeitures and
attorney subpoenas, the issue raises
complex legal and ethical questions relating to the attorney-client
privilege, the confidentiality privilege, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, and due process.
Recently, the IRS mailed to several prominent criminal defense attorneys a request in the form of a
"check sheet" for information from
those attorneys who, in filing Form
8300 ("Report of Cash Payments
Over $10,000 Received in a Trade
or Business"), withheld information concerning either the identity
of the individual from whom the
cash was received, the individual or

Criminal Justice
Heinonline

--

5 Crim. Just. 22 1990-1991

organization for whom the transaction was conducted, or a description of the transaction or the
method of payment. The IRS letter
concluded: "Failing to voluntarily
submit the requested information
could result in summons enforcement action being initiated." Assuming, arguendo, that the attorney
received cash payments from a
client who does not consent to have
his or her identity revealed, what
are the attorney's legal and ethical
options and obligations in the event
that enforcement action is initiated?
26 U.S.C. 5 60501 provides:
(a) Cash receipts of more than
$10,000.-Any person(1) who is engaged in a trade
or business, and
(2) who, in the course of such
trade or business, receives
more than $10,000 in cash in
1 transaction (or 2 or more
related transactions), shall
make a return described in
subsection (b) with respect to
such transaction (or related
transactions) at such time as
the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
(b) Form and manner of returns.-A
return i s described in this subsection if
such return (1) is in such form that the
Secretary may prescribe,
(2) contains(A) the name, address,
and TIN of the person
from whom the cash was
received;
(B) the amount of cash
received;
(C) the date and nature
of the transaction; and
(D) such other information as the Secretary may
prescribe.
The regulations implementing §
60501 require that reports be filed
within 15 days of the completion of
the transaction or series of transactions involving cash payments in
the same case. (26 CFR 5 1.605011 .) These reports, designated Form
8300 by the IRS, are to be mailed
to a central location where the in-

formation is entered into a computer.
Since November 1988, willful
failure to file a Form 8300 is a felony punishable by imprisonment
for up to five years and a fine of up
to $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of
a corporation). (26 USC § 7203.)
There is also a civil penalty for intentional failure to file: ten percent
of the amount which should have
been reported, or ten percent of the
taxable income derived from the
transaction. (26 USC 5 6721(b).)

Ethical rules of confidentiality
However, the requirement that
an attorney disclose a client's identity may clash with rules of professional conduct that broadly prohibit
disclosure of information acquired
by the attorney during the professional relationship. Clearly, responsible attorneys d o not wish to
violate either the federal currencyreporting regulations or the professional discliplinary rules that protect client confidences and secrets.
Those ethical rules are embodied
in Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and DR 4101 of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules
provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation, and
except as authorized in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely
to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a crimi-
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nal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the
client.
The so-called confidentiality
privilege includes but is broader
than the attorney-client privilege.
The Comment to Rule 1.6 observes
that "the confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source."
DR 4-101 of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers
to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassingor would
be likely to be detrimental to the
client.
(6) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall
not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or
secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client
consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets
with the consent of the client
or clients affected, but only
after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets
when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by
law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client
to commit a crime and the
information necessary t o
prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets
necessary to establish or col-

lect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation
of wrongful conduct.

Attorney-client privilege
narrowly construed
No court has yet decided whether the duty to protect client confidences extends to the reporting requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 60501.
Several state and local ethics committees (e.g., Florida, Georgia, and
Chicago) have concluded that the
duty does extend to such reports.
Other ethics committees have issued advisory opinions discussing
the attorney's duty (e.g., New Mex-

ico, Kentucky, Connecticut, Philadelphia, and the District of Columbia). However, the ethical
standards' confidentiality requirements are broader than the confidentiality requirements of evidentiary privileges. The attorney-client
privilege-an evidentiary privilege-has not fared well in the federal courts as a basis for refusing to
reveal a client's identity. This is so
with respect to both grand jury
subpoena enforcement and IRS
summons enforcement.
Because it is an impingement on
the search for truth, the attorneyclient privilege is narrowly construed. The privilege exists to protect confidential communications
between a lawyer and his or her

client that relate to the legal interests of the client and society. (J.
Wigmore, 8 Evidence § 2291
(McNaughton Rev Ed 1961).) The
policy behind the privilege is to
promote freedom of consultation
of legal advisors by clients. In order
to dispel the fear of compelled disclosures, the law prohibits disclosures of such confidential communications except with the client's
consent. (Upjohn Co. v United
States, 449 US 383 (1981).) However, the attorney-client privilege is
limited to communications that are
necessary to obtain informed legal
advice. As a general rule, therefore,
neither the identity of a client nor
the fee arrangement comes within
the scope of the privilege, since
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neither matter is considered confidential or a communication for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice.
(in re Grand jury Proceedings Uones),
517 F2d 666 (5th Cir 1975).)
To be sure, some clients might
feel inhibited about retaininga lawyer, or might be less candid in their
disclosures, if they anticipated that
their attorney might be compelled
to reveal their identities or the fee
arrangements. This concern, however, seems unavailing. As one
court recently observed:
Some prospective clients, arguably, may decide not to retain
counsel for legal services if they
could be implicated by expenditures for those services. This is

not, however, a sufficient justification to invoke the privilege.
The privilege i s not to immunize
a client from liability stemming
from expenditures for legal services. Its purpose is only to encourage persons who choose to
be represented by counsel, despite the consequences of that
choice, to confer candidly and
openly with their attorney. (Tornay v United States, 840 F2d
1424, 1429 (9th Cir 1988).)
The courts, however, have established three narrow exceptions
to the general rule that client identity and fee arrangements are not
covered by the attorney-client
privilege. The first exception lies
when the disclosure of identity or
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fee arrangements would supply the
"last link" in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead
to the client's indictment (In re
Grand jury Proceedings (Pavlick),
680 F2d 1026 (5th Cir 1982) (en
banc)); the second, when disclosure would implicate the client in
the very matter for which legal advice was sought in the first place
(United States v Hodge and Zweig,
548 F2d 1347 (9th Cir 1977)); and
the third, when disclosure would be
tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential communication (NLRB v Harvey, 349
F2d 900 (4th Cir 1965)). The burden of establishing the existence of
a privilege rests with the party asserting the privilege. Thus, it would

be appropriate for the attorney to
request an in camera ex parte hearing to support his or her claim.
(United States v Zolin, 109 S Ct 2619
(1989).)

Court enforcement of
IRS efforts
Given the broad investigative
powers of both the grand jury and
the IRS (see United States v Arthur
Young & Co., 465 US 805 (1984))
and the public outcry against drug
trafficking, racketeering, and money laudering, it is not surprising that
the courts have been reluctant to
sustain claims of privilege-or, for
that matter, broader constitutional
claims of right to counsel or due
process. Indeed, IRS efforts pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 5 7602 (the general summons enforcement section
of the Internal Revenue Code) to
force attorneys to reveal information regarding fees paid by clients
have invariably been enforced by
the courts, so long as the government has established the threshold
requirements that: 1) the investigation is being conducted for a legitimate purpose; 2) the information
is relevant to the investigation; 3)
the information i s not already in the
IRS's possession; and 4) administrative steps required by the IRS code
have been followed. (United States
v Powell, 379 US 48, 57-58 (1 964).)
Nor have the courts required the
IRS to establish guidelines for the
issuance of summonses to attorneys or to show that it followed justice Department guidelines (U.S.
Attorney Manual 5 9-2.161) already established for issuing grand
jury subpoenas to attorneys. (Holihed v United States, 689 F Supp 865
(ED Wis 1988).)
The justice Department's Subpoena Guidelines-not
followed
by the IRS-provide that a subpoena to an attorney for client information may not be issued unless
the prosecutor can demonstrate
that: (1) there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has
been or i s being committed and that
the information sought is reasonably needed for the successful completion of the investigation; (2) the

subpoena will not be used to obtain peripheral or speculative information; (3) all reasonable attempts
to obtain the information from alternative sources proved to be unsuccessful; and (4) the reasonable
need for the information outweighs the potential adverse effects upon the attorney-client
relationship.

What to advise your client
What are the lawyer's obligations when advising a client who
wishes to pay a cash fee in excess
of $10,000? Clearly, the lawyer must
advise the client that the lawyer
may have a duty to file a Form 8300
disclosing the client's identity, the
amount of cash received, and the
date and nature of the transaction.
The lawyer should also inform the
client of the risks of investigation
and prosecution flowing from disclosure of the client's identity and
fee information. The client should
make the decision, after full consultation, about whether his or her
identity should be disclosed. If the
client decides that his or her identity should not be disclosed, the
lawyer may ethically decline the
representation or, if a relationship
already exists, may withdraw in
view of the apparent conflict and
threat of prosecution for both attorney and client. O n the other
hand, the attorney may ethically

choose to continue to represent the
client and to refuse to disclose the
client's identity, although the lawyer is statutorily obligated to file
Form 8300. (See Georgia Advisory
Opinion No 41; Hall, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Lawyer § 11.7.)
If the IRS threatens enforcement,
the attorney may continue to assert
confidentiality until a judicial enforcement order requiring disclosure is obtained. Under DR 4101(C)(2) of the Model Code, a
lawyer "may reveal . . . confidences or secrets . . . required by
law or court order." The client
should be advised that he or she
may seek to retain separate counsel to intervene and challenge the
I R S enforcement action. (FRCP
24(a)(2).) If faced with a court order
to comply, the lawyer will have to
decide whether to risk contempt in
order to appeal the order. (Cobbledick v United States, 309 US 323
(1940).)
As noted above, an IRS enforcement "test case" against a New
York law firm and two of its attorneys is currently being litigated. A
decision by the district court is expected shortly.

Bennett 1. Gershman is a professor
of law a t Pace University School of
Law in White Plains, New York,
where he teaches criminal law and
evidence. He is the author of Prosecutorial Misconduct.

LIVINGSTON HALL JUVENILEJUSTICE
AWARD NOMINATIONS SOUGHT
The ABA Criminal Justice Section is seeking nominations for the
1990 Liv~ngstonHall Award. The ABA's annual Livingston Hall
juvenile justice Award is bestowed upon a juvenile justice
practitioner for his or her contributions, with the highest degree
of protessionalism, to the juvenile justice system.
Contact the ABA Criminal Justice Section at 202/331-2260 for
information on selection criteria and nom~natingprocedures.
The deadline for nominations is May 1, 1990.
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